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When will Russians rise up against the Kremlin’s war of aggression?

PHOTO: Silar, CC BY-SA 4.0.

Home » Blog articles » When will Russians rise up against the Kremlin’s war of aggression?

Matti Puolakka often spoke of Nazi Germany as an extreme example of a self-destructive society:

“It’s astonishing how little real rebellion there was in Nazi Germany. By destroying all forces opposed to the prevailing order, Nazi Germany made itself non-viable as a human society – doomed to destruction.”[1]

Non-viability means that society is incapable of turning away from the path chosen by its leaders. The destruction of opposition in Nazi Germany meant that all critical voices within the elite were also silenced. The regime was incapable of reversing its course.

Social crises always begin with a split in the ruling class – with public disagreement among them about the direction of society. In Nazi Germany, those in power remained united throughout the war until the surrender, i.e. their total destruction. Unity proved fatal for them.

Comparing Nazi Germany with Putin’s Russia

So the question “When will the Russians rise up against the Kremlin’s war of aggression?” should rather be put like this: “When will the liberal forces of the elite rise up against the Kremlin’s war of aggression? Or will they rise at all?”

Nobody knows. – Why not?

Russia is the first kleptocratic imperialist country in history. It is also the first kleptocratic imperialist country to wage a war of aggression that it can only lose. But it is also a country with nuclear weapons, which means that it cannot be occupied or forced to surrender unconditionally and transform its society.

Nevertheless, the best point of comparison for contemporary Russia’s development is Hitler’s Germany. The two countries have a lot in common:

  • Both are waging a brutal imperialist war.
  • Domestic opposition has been crushed.
  • The imperialist ideology and war also have many supporters.
  • Both countries have a defeated war behind them which has caused more or less justified bitterness: for Germany, the First World War and the Peace of Versailles; for Russia, the Cold War, which ended in the plundering of the country’s national wealth, misery and chaos.
  • Both countries have suffered economic problems, which the government has overcome.

The main difference in the Kremlin’s advantage over the powers it sees as its enemies is Russia’s nuclear weapons. All other differences in that respect are in favour of Nazi Germany: Germany was neither kleptocratic nor deindustrialised. Germany had powerful allies, notably Japan and Italy. Germany was not a multinational state like Russia. In Germany, the people were harnessed to the war – officially, Russia is not even waging war. In Germany, there was no internet as an alternative to state propaganda. And human rights and their violations in general were not so high on the agenda in the world of that time.

On the left, an original Time magazine cover; on the right, an internet meme made from it, which immediately went viral (like countless other Putin memes).

Germany was destroyed mainly because its leadership, already before the war, made itself incapable of making even the most rudimentary rational decisions, even for the country’s imperialist interests. It entered into a two-front war that it knew would be fatal. As a result, its cities were bombed to the ground, the war was finally fought on its soil, it was forced to surrender unconditionally, and it was occupied. The top leaders who did not commit suicide were hanged as war criminals.

The Kremlin is turning Russia into a failed state

The Russian leadership is incapable of changing its policy because critical views within the elite have been silenced. It is driving itself deeper and deeper into a dead end, turning Russia into a failed state. Writing in The Economist, journalist Arkady Ostrovsky listed examples of this: [2]

  • Russia’s borders have become blurred as the Kremlin has annexed territories that have never belonged to Russia and over which its army has been unable to gain control.
  • The Kremlin has given up the state’s monopoly on the use of physical force. Yevgeny Prigozhin has his private army, the paramilitary Wagner Group, and the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov also has his own army.
  • The Kremlin has failed in its most basic function: it is not protecting the citizens but is itself the biggest threat to their lives, using them as cannon fodder.
  • The mobilisation launched by the Kremlin caused more turmoil than the start of the war.
  • The Kremlin has driven itself into a situation where it cannot win the war, but it cannot end it either.

The list of Kremlin actions that are turning Russia into a failed state can be continued:

  • The country is waging war and wants to mobilise the people to support it, but it is forbidden, on pain of imprisonment, to call the war a war.
  • A further mobilisation is necessary to supply the front with cannon fodder, but to declare a new mobilisation would probably plunge the country into irreversible chaos, and the Kremlin knows this.
  • Prigozhin is recruiting murderers and robbers for the criminal war, promising them amnesty after their service. In practice, his position as the owner of a private army has elevated him to the supreme judicial power, above the courts and even Putin.[3] The last vestiges of any notion of some legality as the basis of society are being shattered.
  • Armed crime has exploded, especially in the areas bordering Ukraine, meaning that Russian soldiers are smuggling weapons across the border.[4]
  • Putin can no longer appear in public at events where he would have to give any kind of overview of the situation or where anyone could publicly question him about it.[5] – The institutionalised lie could not be greater

On the internal situation in Russia

According to the researcher Tatiana Stanovaya, there is no peace opposition within the Russian elite. Instead, there is a growing fear that if nothing is done, the war will end in defeat, which could even lead to war crimes trials. The elite is divided: On one side are the “realists” who consider the war a mistake (although they do not say so publicly) and would like to see a pause in the fighting so that Russia can strengthen its economy and army. On the other side are the “radicals” who want to escalate the war immediately. Both camps are unhappy with Putin and see him as a weak leader.[6]

Julia Davis, a journalist who regularly publishes reviews of the Russian media, recently made the following observation: propagandists on state television who advocate escalating the war and even threatening to use nuclear weapons are sharply attacking those they doubt about peace projects, calling them ”traitors to the Motherland”.[7] In fact, the only proposal for “peace negotiations” has come from Putin.[8] Behind it is the hope that the West would cut aid to Ukraine and put pressure on it to negotiate, forcing it to concede at least to Russia’s territorial demands.

The propagandists presumably know that there is a growing number among the elite who view the war as a mistake and want to end it, even at the risk of seeing at least the worst war criminals prosecuted. – Behind the propagandists’ accusations lies a real fear of defeat and possible war crimes convictions. The same fear is reflected in Progazhin’s call for “urgent Stalinist repression” against those Russian tycoons who are not sufficiently supportive of the war.[9]

After Navalny was detained in early 2021, his foundation released a video of Putin’s palace. According to Navalny, the palace grounds include, for example, a casino, a skating rink and a vineyard. A screenshot from the video.

In his “offer to negotiate”, Putin called the war a war for the first time. But that does not reduce the contradiction between reality and official propaganda – on the contrary: calling the “special military operation” a war is a crime under the law for which thousands of Russians have already been convicted.

There is no prospect of active public resistance. However, a new mobilisation could change the situation – at least it would cause more turmoil than the previous one.

In general, opinion polls show a clear trend: despite the constant militaristic propaganda in the state media, support for the war and belief in a Russian victory are waning. This is evident, for example, from Leonid Volkov’s account of the regular polls conducted by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation.[10]

Russia appears unable to make any significant breakthroughs in its war, although it has been able to increase the number of troops on the front line and may be planning a new offensive. What it can do, above all, is to use terrorist bombing to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure and thus inflict suffering on the civilian population. But it cannot break the Ukrainian will to fight. On the other hand, a decisive Ukrainian military victory in the coming months is unlikely.

The International Centre for the Study of Eurasia recently published its assessment of the impact of the sanctions imposed on Russia: the Russian economy is in an irreversible decline. The real impact of the sanctions will be felt in mid-2023.[11] Whether this is the case or not, it, too, shows an inevitable trend.

How will Russia collapse?

Russia will not collapse in the same way as Nazi Germany. For Russia, the first question is: how will the kleptocracy collapse?

As such, kleptocracy is the hallmark of a state on the road to collapse. In a kleptocracy, at least some people are allowed to break the laws and regulations, at least to some extent.

The main element that holds a kleptocracy together is the opportunity to steal and to control who can steal and how much. These opportunities have been narrowing in Russia. State revenues are drying up, the war is draining money, and the sanctions are hampering the transfer of assets to the West.

What will happen in Russia when the kleptocrats have nothing left to steal? Will they perhaps turn into law-abiding businessmen, officials, and politicians who carry out their duties conscientiously?

In Russia, the trend towards a failed state can only intensify. Laws and regulations are becoming more and more arbitrary and are increasingly being broken or ignored.

A good example of this is the decree on mobilisation. Liberal technocrats, who think it was a mistake to start a war, did not obey it. The mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyanin, ended the mobilisation in Moscow on his own, declaring that the objectives set had been met. But even the supporters of the war did not actually comply with the decree. To be more precise, they obeyed it in a way that only added to the confusion: people, who should have been exempted, for example, on health or professional grounds, were recruited; they were not, as they should have been, assigned to tasks that corresponded to their special skills, but ICT specialists and doctors, for example, were sent to the front with weapons in their hands, etc.[12] And those who were recruited were not provided with equipment and training.

The aim of tightening up coercive measures, laws, and actions restricting opposition activities and civil rights has been to passivise the citizens. It has been successful. Markku Kivinen, the former director of the Alexander Institute (the Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies), has aptly stated that in contrast to Nazism, in Russian fascism “the people have not been activated, but rather passivised”. [13] Opposition to the Kremlin’s actions increasingly appears as passive resistance. Resistance to the mobilisation takes the form of hiding from the call-up authorities or fleeing abroad. And refusal to serve is justified on the grounds of lack of training or equipment.

Passive resistance also extends to the elite. Sobyanin resisted the mobilisation by ending it in Moscow on his own initiative. The president of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, opposed it by complaining that the mobilisation was causing labour shortage and could lead to higher inflation.[14]

Acts of resistance may not be fully conscious, but they will inevitably increase and become more conscious because the laws and regulations imposed by the Kremlin are becoming more and more divorced from reality as it has denied itself the opportunity to hear criticism and correct its policies.

The pro-Kremlin forces are following orders in a way that only makes them more damaging, as happened with the mobilisation. And if the implementation of an order makes it possible to steal state or private funds, the opportunity is hardly missed.

Putin recently declared a de facto war economy. He said there were no funding restrictions for the military:

“The country, the government will give everything that the army asks for. Everything.”[15]

In practice, the Kremlin’s decision means that the military will get an ever larger share of the state’s dwindling revenues. The kleptocracy is also increasingly concentrated in the military. In October, the United Russia MP lieutenant general Andrey Gurulev reported that 1.5 million sets of army uniforms had gone missing.[16] In all probability, they were never produced – most likely a theft of state funds through accounting fraud.

The legitimacy of the Russian regime is crumbling. Arbitrariness and all sorts of disintegrating tendencies are on the rise. Kleptocracy is turning from a factor holding the elite together into a force accelerating the disintegration of the society as a whole.

References

[1] Matti Puolakka, an unpublished dictation, 18 November 2013.

[2] “Russia risks becoming ungovernable and descending into chaos.” The Economist, 18 November 2022.  

[3] Aleksei Navalny’s tweet chain, 21 December 2022.  

[4] “Armed Crime on the Rise in Russia”, The Moscow Times, 23 November 2022.  

[5] ”Putin peruu lisää julkisia esiintymisiä”, Helsingin Sanomat, 15 November 2022.  

[6] “The Schism in Russia’s Elite is Only Growing as Defeats Pile up in Ukraine”, The Moscow Times, 19 December 2022.  

[7] “Kremlin State Media Turns on Russian Elite in Paranoid Frenzy over War in Ukraine”, The Daily Beast, 19.12.2022.  

[8] “Putin Uses Word War Fighting Ukraine”, CNN, 22 December 2022

[9]  ”Rise of Russia Hardliners Sows Fear In Putin’s Elite”, Bloomberg News, 8 November 2022.

[10] Leonid Volkov’s tweet chain, 19 December 2022

[11] “Sanctions Against Russia – What Impact?”, International Center for the Study of Eurasia, Brief n. 25, December 2022.

[12] ”Moskovassa loput mobilisoiduista etsittiin ratsaamalla siirtolaisia hostelleista”, Helsingin Sanomat, 18 October 2022.

[13] ”Putinin Venäjässä on yhä enemmän fasistisia piirteitä sanoo Aleksanteri-instituutin entinen johtaja Markku Kivinen. Mitään vasemmistolaista ei siinä ole”, Kansan uutiset, 21 December 2022

[14] “Russia’s Central Bank Warns of Labor Shortage Following Mobilisation”, The Moscow Times, 16 December 2022

[15] “Vladimir Putin promises army anything it asks for, as invasion enters 11th month”, The Guardian, 21 December 2022.

[16] “ ’Where did they disappear to?’: Russian local PM says 1.5 mln military uniforms are missing”, Novaya Gazeta, 2 October 2022

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